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In Rucho v. Common Cause, and its companion Lamone
v. Benisek, a sharply divided Supreme Court declined
the opportunity to set constitutional limits on partisan
manipulation of electoral district lines.1 Writing for a fivejustice majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts concluded that
“partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions
beyond the reach of the federal courts” because “[f]ederal
judges have no license to reallocate political power between the
two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority
in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct
their decisions.”2 Consequently, because the federal courts
“have no commission to allocate political power and influence
in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to
guide [them] in the exercise of such authority,” he concluded
that these cases were non-justiciable.3
Rucho is not an easy case to take seriously as doctrine. Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion is more redolent of a debater’s brief
* Edward and Ellen Schwarzman Professor of Law, Duke Law.
** Professor of Law; Class of 1950 Herman B. Wells Endowed Professor, Indiana University
Bloomington Maurer School of Law.
1
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2
Id. at 2506–07.
3
Id. at 2508.
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than a judicial opinion. Rucho deploys a series of arguments
against the justiciability of political-gerrymandering claims,
relying on no single argument and committed to nothing but
the conclusion of non-justiciability. Critically, the opinion
is an amalgam of misdirections, distortions, and less-thanpellucid thinking about the constitutionalization of politicalgerrymandering claims. This is what the Court’s inexorable
fealty to non-justiciability gets us.
Consider, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion
that the Constitution does not authorize federal judges to
reallocate power between the two major political parties. As
the chief justice well knows, or as he certainly ought to know,
the plaintiffs were not asking the Court to “reallocate political
power between the two major political parties.”4 That way of
framing the problem presents it as a structural claim, which, in
the domain of law and democracy, the Court has rejected every
single time.5 Rather, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to do
what it has done for over half a century, since the landmark
reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr—to protect the individual
right to vote by limiting the power of government officials to
intentionally dilute the individual’s vote when it draws voting
districts.6 Framing election law claims as purely structural, and
thus dismissing them, is a time-honored device.7 It ignores the
fact that law-and-democracy claims are dualistic: Individual
and structural rights are two sides of the same law-and-politics

Id. at 2507.
See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (2005).
6
See Amicus Brief of Mathematicians, Law Professors, and Students in Support of
Appellees and Affirmance at 4, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (Nos. 18–422, 18–726); see also
Charles, supra note 5, at 1128.
7
See generally Charles, supra note 5.
4
5
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claim.8 The distortion of the question presented, to present
the opponent’s claim in its most unfavorable light, is a clever
debater’s trick.9 But it is a distortion; it fails to respond to the
plaintiffs’ actual claim.
Reasonable minds can disagree about the necessity of
judicial supervision of partisan line-drawing. And one could
imagine a persuasive doctrinal argument counseling against
judicial supervision. But one would have to imagine that
argument, as it was not offered in Rucho. This is because Rucho
is not about doctrine. As Justice Kagan shows in her powerful
dissent, there are easy responses to the majority’s contentions.10
By way of example, responding to the majority’s argument that
judicial supervision in this area can only mean that the federal
courts would endeavor to allocate political power between the
two major parties, she notes, matter-of-factly, that the lower
federal courts in the very cases before the Supreme Court have
done what the majority said could not be done.11 These lower
courts have adjudicated these cases pursuant to recognizable
legal standards and vindicated individual constitutional rights.
Betraying her annoyance with the majority, Justice Kagan
calls the majority’s lack of engagement with the lower courts’
substantive legal analysis “discomfiting.”12 The ease with
which Justice Kagan was able to refute the majority’s doctrinal
 s a general matter, structural claims must be converted to an individual rights
A
framework to make the claims justiciable, which is how the Court has historically resolved
election law claims. Charles, supra note 5, at 1102.
9
It is notable that Justice Kagan, in her dissenting opinion, articulates the harm of partisan
gerrymandering in both structural and individual rights terms. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering “subverts democracy”
and “violates individuals’ constitutional rights”).
10
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509.
11
Id. at 2516 (“But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose:
What it says can’t be done has been done.”).
12
Id. at 2517.
8
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arguments is indicative of the limited role played by legal
doctrine in the majority’s constitutional analysis.
In the course of wrapping up her dissent, after refuting each
aspect of the majority’s arguments against justiciability, Justice
Kagan offers a tantalizing set of observations that invite further
reflection. She notes that the gerrymandering claims at the
heart of this litigation “imperil our system of government.”13
This is where the Court must step in, she writes, because
“[p]art of the Court’s role in [our constitutional] system is to
defend its foundations.”14 And importantly, she argues that no
foundation “is more important than free and fair elections.”15
We’d like to pick up where Justice Kagan left off. The
concluding paragraph in her dissent raises a critical question:
Why are the conservative justices in the Rucho majority
uninterested in defending the foundations of American
Democracy? To phrase the question differently, why is there
such a divide on the Court about whether it is appropriate for
the Court to safeguard the fundamental rules of representative
democracy? This ought to be the central question for scholars
of law and politics. The importance of the question reaches
beyond Rucho and the issue of political gerrymandering. It is
the core question, for example, in Baker v. Carr,16 the case that
frames the field of law and politics to this day. It is also the
question in Shelby County v. Holder,17 the case that struck down
a significant part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. If the Court
is not defending the foundations of representative democracy,
what is it defending?
Id. at 2525.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
13
14
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We argue that Chief Justice Roberts and the Rucho majority’s
commitment to non-justiciability of partisan gerrymandering
claims is a function of the majority’s attachment and normative
commitment to a particular understanding of politics in a
representative democracy. For the majority, politics is sordid,
partisan, and unfair. For the conservatives on the Court,
political-gerrymandering claims ask the Court to perform a
task that courts are ill-equipped to perform, which is to clean
up a process that is inherently dirty and to make fair a process
that is inherently partial. Consequently, Rucho is not simply
an affirmation of a traditional conception of politics; it is also
a rejection of a more modern conception that is beginning to
find a foothold in American politics—with roots in the Court’s
malapportionment jurisprudence—about how representative
democratic institutions ought to operate. This more modern
approach reflects the beliefs that representative electoral
structures and American politics more generally ought to
include some basic notion of fairness: a commitment to the
public good without the hindrance of partisanship and a
conception of fair play that constrains the behavior of those
who design electoral structures. In contrast to the majority in
Rucho, proponents of the modern conception envision a role for
the Court in enforcing basic rules of fairness and fair play while
at the same time indirectly promoting a particular vision of the
public good that is not filtered through partisan identity in the
design of structures of representation.
In order to understand the division in Rucho and, as
importantly, to understand why the plaintiffs in Rucho failed to
win over the conservatives on the Court, we have to come to
terms with these different worldviews on the Court. Is sordid
politics an inherently necessary and arguably normatively good
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part of the political process, and thus a necessary part of our
representative institutions? Relatedly, do substantive fairness
principles exist—outside of race and the equal-population
principle—that constrain political actors when they design
electoral structures to favor themselves at the expense of their
opponents? We take up these questions in the pages that follow.
Part I discusses the majority’s reasoning in Rucho. Part
II suggests that Rucho reflects a traditional understanding
of politics in which dirty partisan politics is rightly a part of
the political process. By way of conclusion, the article offers
thoughts on the shift from normative theorizing to empiricism
in the field of law and politics and, more importantly, why we
remain optimistic even in the wake of Rucho.
I. R
 ucho’s Reasoning: The Inevitably of NonJusticiability
In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts offers three arguments
in favor of non-justiciability. The opinion does not engage
seriously with any single argument and generally deploys
the arguments as foils to prop up its conclusion of nonjusticiability. Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s first objection,
the contention that the Framers intended to resolve politicalgerrymandering claims through the political process. Chief
Justice Roberts notes that these claims are at least as old as,
perhaps older than, the Republic. “The practice was known
in the Colonies prior to Independence, and the Framers were
familiar with it at the time of the drafting and ratification
of the Constitution.”18 The Framers addressed the prospect
of partisan gerrymandering, Chief Justice Roberts argues,
through the Constitution’s penchant for addressing structural
18

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494.
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problems with structural devices.19 Article I, section 4, clause
1 of the Constitution, the Elections Clause, delegates to state
legislatures the primary responsibility for arranging the
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for federal
representatives. But the Framers also provided through the
Elections Clause that “Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations.” And, Chief Justice Roberts contends,
Congress has taken its supervisory authority seriously. For
example, relatively early on, in 1842, Congress adopted a
statute requiring single-member districts for elections for the
House of Representatives.20 The implication from that part of
Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis is that the Framers devised a
workable and working solution to the problem. Originalism
carries the day.
But it is unclear from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion what
work his reliance on originalism is doing in the analysis. On
the one hand, he concedes that the originalism analysis cannot
support a conclusion that “the Framers set aside electoral issues
such as the one before us as questions that only Congress can
resolve.”21 This is because the argument that the federal courts
cannot address claims that the government unconstitutionally
manipulated electoral lines proves too much. “In two areas—
one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering—our cases
have held that there is a role for the courts with respect to at
least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of
congressional districts.”22
Id. at 2494–95; id. at 2496 (“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and
considered what to do about them. They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning
the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal
Congress.”).
20
Id. at 2495.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 2495–96.
19

299

ACS Supreme Court Review

On the other hand, notwithstanding that concession, Chief
Justice Roberts argues that “the history is not irrelevant.”23
The historical evidence matters because it shows that “[a]t no
point [in the historical record] was there a suggestion that the
federal courts had a role to play.”24 And from his search of the
historical record, Chief Justice Roberts concludes that there was
not “any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts”
addressing partisan gerrymandering claims.25
Chief Justice Roberts seems to be looking for evidence
that the Framers assigned the resolution of partisan
gerrymandering claims to the federal courts if he is to entertain
the prospect of judicial review of line-drawing claims. This
analytical posture presupposes the unavailability of judicial
review, as a general matter, unless proponents of judicial
review prove otherwise. That is, unless proponents of judicial
supervision find proof positive in the historical record that the
Framers intended to delegate the resolution of these issues to
the federal courts, they are out of luck. Chief Justice Roberts
uses the originalism argument to create a presumption in
favor of non-justiciability and to place the burden of proof on
supporters of justiciability. This newly-created presumption is
doing all of the work in the analysis.
However, the presumption of non-justiciability—the
assumption that the Court will find that electoral-structure
cases are non-justiciable unless otherwise proved—appears
to be a change of the current doctrine. With the exception of
cases arising under the Guarantee Clause,26 the Court has not,
up until now, placed a category of cases outside of judicial
Id. at 2496.
Id.
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justiciable, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 849, 864 (1994).
23
24
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review unless proponents can prove otherwise by citing the
words and ideas of the founding generation. At the very least,
prior to Rucho, justiciability has seemed to be an open question,
and one might go so far as to argue that the Court generally
assumes justiciability unless there is affirmative evidence, in
the constitutional text, history, or structure, that the matter was
committed to another branch.27
But more importantly, and to reiterate a point noted above,
Chief Justice Roberts’s originalism analysis is not squarely
relevant to the resolution of the cases before the Court. To be
sure, it might have been relevant if these were cases of first
impression. But they are not. The Court has already determined
that electoral-structure claims are justiciable. This was Baker
v. Carr.28 (And crucially, the Court has also created judicial
standards out of whole cloth. This was Reynolds v. Sims.29)
To be sure, it is also conceivable that the presumption of
non-justiciability might be determinative in future law-anddemocracy cases. That is, Rucho might stand for the proposition
that future plaintiffs must affirmatively show that the Framers
intended a judicial resolution of these cases. But as to Rucho, it
is immaterial what the Framers thought about the justiciability
of political-structure claims generally; what matters is whether
the types of political-structure claims that the Court has
previously found to be justiciable can be distinguished from the
claim before the Court.
I n the landmark political question case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court stated,
“the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a
political question.” Id. at 209. The Court further stated: “Prominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” Id. at 217. Baker seems to
imply, if not explicitly provide, that non-justicability must be affirmatively demonstrated
by showing that the issue was assigned to a political branch.
28
Id.
29
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27
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This leads to Chief Justice Roberts’s second argument. He
appears to be boxed in by two sets of cases that the Court has
previously determined to be justiciable—one-person, onevote and racial-gerrymandering claims. Chief Justice Roberts
initially attempts to distinguish malapportionment and racialgerrymandering claims from political-gerrymandering claims
on the ground that “while it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart
from the one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial
discrimination in districting,” political gerrymandering is not
illegal.30 But of course, it is no answer to distinguish politicalgerrymandering claims from malapportionment or racialgerrymandering claims on the ground that the Constitution
prohibits state actors from engaging in the underlying conduct
that gives rise to those claims. Malapportionment claims were
once legal, just like political-gerrymandering claims, and the
Court was not always of the view that federal courts were
capable of remedying racial discrimination in the exercise of
political rights.31 Chief Justice Roberts is simply begging the
question, which is whether it should be illegal for state actors
to undermine the individual’s right to vote by manipulating
electoral lines for partisan gain. This is the same question, in
slightly different form, that the Court asked generations ago:
whether it is illegal for the government to manipulate electoral
lines through malapportionment. The Court answered the
second question in Baker v. Carr.32 As it did then, the least the
Court could do today is take up the question, rather than profess
the inability to decide it.

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial
Restraint, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 236 (2018).
32
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (holding malapportionment claims justiciable).
30
31
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Chief Justice Roberts distinguishes the justiciable electoralstructure cases from the political-gerrymandering cases in
two ways. First, he turns to a classic move in the case law
and argues that partisanship in the construction of electoral
structures is not per se unconstitutional. “To hold that
legislators cannot take partisan interests into account when
drawing district lines would essentially countermand the
Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.”33
Thus, he counsels that ‘’[t]he ‘central problem’ [in the
partisan gerrymandering cases] is not determining whether
a jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is
‘determining when political gerrymandering has gone too
far.’”34 The federal courts have no basis for determining how
much partisanship is too much without making judgments,
political judgments, about the allocation of political
power. These are the types of judgments that are solely the
responsibility of the political branches.
Second, partisan gerrymandering cases are about group
rights and the allocation of group political power; partisangerrymandering claims assume a constitutional violation on the
basis of the inability of a group, in this case a political party, to
translate electoral support into legislative power.35 As such, and
to turn once again to an old canard, partisan-gerrymandering
claims “invariably sound in a desire for proportional
representation.”36 The essence of a partisan-gerrymandering
claim is that dramatic departures from proportionality are
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497.
Id. at 2499 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (plurality opinion)).
35
Id. (“Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of
political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and influence.”).
36
Id. Roberts explicitly relies on a critique raised by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor over
thirty years ago in the Court’s first explicit confrontation with the issue of politicalgerrymandering cases. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986).
33
34
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indicative of the state’s alleged unconstitutional manipulation
of electoral lines in the pursuit of partisan advantage.
However, Chief Justice Roberts argues that neither
historical practices nor the Court’s precedents requires
proportional representation. “For more than 50 years after
ratification of the Constitution,” he writes, “many States elected
their congressional representatives through at-large or ‘general
ticket’ elections.”37 Additionally, when Congress legislated the
use of single-member districts in congressional elections, it
did not do so in the service of proportionality, but because the
Whig Party assumed, wrongly as it turned out, that switching
from at-large to single-member districts would provide Whigs
with a partisan advantage.38
Given that the Constitution does not require
proportionality, Chief Justice Roberts concludes that courts
have no basis for adjudicating these claims other than some
vague notion of fairness. In his words, “federal courts are not
equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness,
nor is there any basis for concluding that they were authorized
to do so.”39 To determine what is “fair,” federal courts would
need to make numerous political decisions,40 decisions that
trade off different conceptions of “fairness,” none of which are
constitutionally required. For example, designers of electoral
structures can decide to crack and pack voters in districts
to reflect the underlying distribution of the parties’ relative
electoral strengths, or they can make districts as competitive
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499.
Id.
39
Id.
40
This is because, as a point of departure, single-member districts are themselves somewhat
unfair as compared to proportional systems. For instance, single-member districts tend
to overrepresent the majority party and allow a plurality winner to capture one hundred
percent of the seat. Id. at 2500.
37
38
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as possible.41 Either option can be defended on normative
“fairness” grounds.42 “Deciding among . . . these different
visions of fairness,” Chief Justice Roberts argues, “poses basic
questions that are political, not legal.”43 More importantly, “[t]
here are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for
making such judgments, let alone limited and precise standards
that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral.”44
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the
malapportionment cases are not a useful guide. This is
because the equal-population principle, one-person, onevote, “is relatively easy to administer as a matter of math.
The same cannot be said of partisan gerrymandering claims,
because the Constitution supplies no objective measure for
assessing whether a districting map treats a political party
fairly.”45 Crucially, there is no conceptual and legal equivalent
to the equal-population principle in the context of partisan
gerrymandering. One-person, one-vote does not lead to
proportionality; “[i]t does not mean that each party must be
influential in proportion to its number of supporters.”46
For somewhat analogous reasons, the racialgerrymandering cases are also inapposite. Echoing Justice
Frankfurter, Chief Justice Roberts notes that the racialgerrymandering cases are about race and the country’s
history of racial discrimination, not about the design of
electoral structures. This is why the racial-gerrymandering
cases do not raise the “justiciability conundrums” raised

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 2501.
46
Id.
41
42
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by the political-gerrymandering cases.47 “Unlike partisan
gerrymandering claims, a racial-gerrymandering claim does
not ask for a fair share of political power and influence.”48
Thus, racial-discrimination claims do not ask courts to make
political judgments, which courts are unfit to make. Instead,
racial-gerrymandering claims ask whether the government
has classified on the basis of race and seek the “elimination
of a racial classification,” which is presumptively illegal.49
This is why the “predominant purpose test” used in the
racial-gerrymandering cases cannot be deployed in the
partisan-gerrymandering context; the test seeks to identify an
impermissible classification, and because partisanship is not
impermissible, partisan-gerrymandering claims “cannot ask for
the elimination of partisanship.”50
To the Rucho majority, the conclusion is inescapable: Since
the plaintiffs’ position is not supported by the constitutional
text, by historical practices, or by the Court’s precedents, the
Constitution does not authorize the federal courts to adjudicate
their claims.
II. Dirty Politics as Tradition
Rucho follows a line of cases where the Court rejects
the invitation to supervise various fundamental aspects of
democratic politics.51 Just like these prior cases, Rucho offers a
set of standard objections, what we have called a narrative of
non-intervention, to justify its conclusion of non-justiciability.
When the Court decides not to intervene in a law-anddemocracy case, it tells us a story, a narrative, embedded in
Id. at 2502.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 2502–03.
51
Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 31.
47
48
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a set of standard objections about why judicial supervision is
not appropriate. The narrative of non-intervention has four
intertwined standard moves. That is, when the Court holds
that a law-and-democracy case is non-justiciable, it generally
provides a combination of four related reasons for staying on
the sidelines. One reason offered by the Court, sometimes the
first reason offered, is that the Court should not involve itself
in what are essentially political disputes. The role of Article
III courts is to decide issues of law but not politics, which are
the proper domain of the political process. The Court should
refrain from adjudicating these types of cases because to do so
would be to make political and not legal judgments. This is the
law-politics distinction.52
Second, federal courts should only decide individualrights cases, and not cases about the distribution of power
between groups. Electoral-structure cases are the latter; they
force federal courts to make judgments about the appropriate
distribution of power among political groups. These are
judgments that courts are not competent to make, so they
ought not intervene. This is the rights-structure distinction.53
Third, the fact that the Court can intervene to protect
racial groups from discrimination in the political process
does not provide a justification to intervene to protect other
groups. The race cases vindicate individual rights protected
by the Constitution, in particular, the Fourteenth Amendment.
Those cases are therefore inapposite. This is the race-politics
distinction.54
Last, federal courts should not decide political-structure
cases unless they have a judicially-manageable standard—an
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
54
Id. at 248.
52
53
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ex ante rule derived from traditional sources of constitutional
authority designed to cabin judicial discretion by separating
unconstitutional from constitutional behavior. Given the
absence of a judicially-manageable standard, the Court should
not intervene. This is the rules-standards distinction.55
Chief Justice Roberts deploys each of these arguments in
Rucho. From an analytical perspective, there is nothing new in
Rucho; Chief Justice Roberts basically sings from the standard
hymnal. He begins by framing the inquiry using the lawpolitics distinction. As he writes: “The question here is whether
there is an ‘appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary’ in
remedying the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether
such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to
legal principles, or political questions that must find their
solutions elsewhere.”56 Claims of legal right are legal claims
appropriately decided by the federal courts. By contrast,
political-gerrymandering claims, Chief Justice Roberts argues,
while relying on the rights-structure distinction, force courts as
a matter of necessity to determine the appropriate division of
power between political groups. This is because these claims
“rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political
support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power
and influence.”57 This is a problem because federal judges
“are not equipped to apportion political power as a matter of
fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding that they were
authorized to do so.”58 Chief Justice Roberts then goes on to
distinguish the racial-gerrymandering cases, which, at least at
Id. at 249.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
57
Id. at 2499.
58
Id.
55
56
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first blush, seem to be about apportioning political power as
a matter of fairness. He argues that racial gerrymandering is
illegal, and adjudicating racial-gerrymandering claims does
not require federal judges to determine the appropriate level
of group political power and influence.59 Finally, Chief Justice
Roberts uses the rules-standards distinction, which is the core
of his argument. His objection in Rucho comes down to the
view that the Court does not have a legal rule—a rule derived
from its traditional methods of constitutional interpretation—
that can “reliably differentiate unconstitutional from
‘constitutional political gerrymandering.’”60 In the absence of
such a rule, there is no appropriate role for the Court to play.
The narrative of intervention is like a fairytale. It is not
to be taken too seriously or at face value. As Justice Kagan’s
dissent demonstrates, there are clear and easy responses to
the majority’s objections. For example, Chief Justice Roberts’s
argument that the malapportionment cases are distinguishable
from the partisan-gerrymandering cases because “it is illegal
for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-person, one-vote
rule,”61 and these cases are “relatively easy to administer as
a matter of math,”62 is either misleading or simply wrong. It
was not inexorable that the constitutional concept of political
equality would lead to the rule of strict population equality
that is the one-person, one-vote principle.63 The Court made a
conscious choice, in the face of other options, to translate the
Id. at 2502–03.
Id. at 2499 (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 US 541, 551 (1999)).
61
Id. at 2497.
62
Id. at 2501.
63
See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Back to the Beginning: An Essay on the Court, the Law of
Democracy, and Trust, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1045, 1063–64 (2008) (noting that “the Court
in Reynolds pulled its standard of choice essentially out of a hat.”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair Representation, and the Necessary
Question of Judicial Will, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 423, 435 (2005).
59
60
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constitutional concept of political equality into a strict rule of
mathematical equality, at least in the context of congressional
districts. With respect to state legislative districts, the
Court adopted a less strict standard, permitting deviations
from population equality up to ten percent. One would
be hard-pressed to come up with a compelling argument
that the Constitution requires strict population equality in
congressional apportionment but substantial population
equality in state legislative districts.
Moreover, and as importantly, the equivalent to the equalpopulation principle in the context of political gerrymandering
is non-partisanship, the conclusion that partisan considerations
should play no role in redistricting. Indeed, there is at least as
strong of an argument, if not a stronger argument, that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from drawing district
lines in a manner that burdens the individual’s exercise of a
constitutional right—the right to vote because of the voter’s
partisan identity—as there is an argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the government from drawing
malapportioned districts. The majority’s refusal to conclude
that partisanship is unconstitutional—that the government
cannot dilute the individual’s vote because the government
does not like the individual’s expression of her political
identity—enabled it to create a conundrum to bamboozle the
plaintiffs. The problem with the plaintiffs’ claim, the majority
argues, is that they cannot tell us how much partisanship is
too much.64 But that problem is of the majority’s own making.
Chief Justice Roberts’s contention that prohibiting legislators
64

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497. (“The ‘central problem’ is not determining whether a
jurisdiction has engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is ‘determining when political
gerrymandering has gone too far.’”(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (plurality
opinion))).
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from taking “partisan interests into account when drawing
district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’
decision to entrust districting to political entities,”65 does not,
and cannot, address why that same argument does not apply
in the malapportionment context. Thus, the difference between
the constitutional status of malapportionment claims as against
political-gerrymandering claims is simply the Court’s decision
to police the former but not the latter.
Good fairytales are fictitious and far-fetched narratives
that tell stories to illustrate a larger point. To focus on the
far-fetched details is a category error. The moral of the story
is the point of the fairytale; it is the broader lesson that we are
supposed to learn about our world. And sometimes, even in
a good fairytale, the moral of the story is not facially evident.
Like a good fairytale, the narrative of non-intervention
is valuable, not for the details of the narrative, which are
admittedly hyperbolic and cannot be taken at face value, but
for the purported universal truth that it contains. Moreover, as
we sometimes must do with fairytales, we must dig deeper to
understand the moral of the story.
Though not facially evident, we argue here that Chief
Justice Roberts employs the narrative of non-intervention to
(re)affirm a traditional understanding of representative politics.
The fundamental question presented in Rucho is whether
constitutionally enforceable fairness norms exist in the design
of structures of representation, or whether politicians can
construct electoral institutions to advantage their side and
their own voters at the expense of the other side and the other
side’s voters. Rucho (and Benisek) were thought to be, from the

65

Id.
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perspective of the plaintiffs at least, the perfect vehicles for
presenting this question about constitutional fairness. Their
facts offer clear and extreme examples of politicians seeking a
political advantage by selecting some voters for disfavor—by
diluting their votes—because of the voters’ political identity.
As Justice Kagan writes in her dissent, judges should
intervene “in only egregious cases,”66 and the facts in these
cases speak for themselves.67 In Rucho, Republicans in
North Carolina admitted straightforwardly that they drew
the lines to advantage their voters and themselves at the
expense of the Democrats and their voters. For example, State
Representative David Lewis, co-chair of the state’s legislative
body’s redistricting committee, instructed his redistricting
specialist “to create a new map that would maintain the 10–3
composition of the State’s congressional delegation come
what might.”68 Justice Kagan quotes Representative Lewis’s
infamous admission that his committee drew “the maps to
give a partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats
because [I] d[o] not believe that it[’s] possible to draw a map
with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.”69 Representative
Lewis then went on to justify the map on the ground that
“electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So
I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the
country.”70 And, Justice Kagan relays, the map performed as
designed. In both the 2016 election cycle and the 2018 election

Id. at 2516.
Id. at 2509 (“As I relate what happened in those two States, ask yourself: Is this how
American democracy is supposed to work?”) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
68
Id. at 2510.
69
Id.
70
Id.
66
67
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cycle, the Republicans won ten of the thirteen seats.71 Justice
Kagan relays a similar tale in the Benisek case, which involved
gerrymandering by the Democrats.72
After laying out these ghastly facts, Justice Kagan asks,
almost rhetorically: “Now back to the question I asked before:
Is that how American democracy is supposed to work? I have
yet to meet the person who thinks so.”73 She then remarks:
“The majority disputes none of this. I think it is important to
underscore that fact: The majority disputes none of what I
have said (or will say) about how gerrymanders undermine
democracy.”74 The ineluctable answer to Justice Kagan’s
inquiry—given these undisputed facts, is this how democracy
is supposed to work?—ought to lead to an affirmation of the
presumption implied in the question: American democracy is
not supposed to work this way because there are constitutional
rules of fairness that constrain political actors.
But of course, the majority does not find the answer
ineluctable, and it certainly does not share the assumption
that democracy is not supposed to work this way. From the
majority’s perspective, the extent of partisanship in the design
of structures of representation is endogenous to the political
process; the level of partisanship depends upon what the polity
wants, and the political process is free to choose whatever
it wants because the appropriate level of partisanship is a
political judgment. Chief Justice Roberts quotes Gaffney v.
Cummings for the proposition that politics and partisanship
 atthew Bloch & Jasmine C. Lee, North Carolina Special Election Results: Ninth House
M
District, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2019, 12:59 PM). The election for the thirteenth seat in the
2018 cycle was not officially filled until 2019. The election was delayed because fraud
tainted the initial election results. The seat was won by the Republican candidate Dan
Bishop.
72
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2511.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 2512.
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are “inseparable from districting and apportionment.”75 What
is fairness, Chief Justice Roberts asks. Are at-large districts,
which can award a party with all of the seats even though it
received a bare majority of electoral support, inherently unfair?
This means “that a party could garner nearly half of the vote
statewide and wind up without any seats.”76 What about
districts that are gerrymandered for the purpose of reflecting
the polity’s distribution of political power? Are those inherently
unfair? Is it inherently unfair to gerrymander a district to
protect an incumbent or to maintain communities of interest?
These “basic questions,” the majority contends, “are political,
not legal.”77 They involve first-order questions that raise tradeoffs among important values and principles. These are not the
type of trade-offs that the federal courts can make or ought to
make. Is this how a democracy is supposed to work? Well, yes,
if that is what the democracy wants.
Rucho often reads like a descriptive account of American
representative politics. But of course, the majority’s opinion
cannot work simply as description. The question presented in
Rucho is not whether politicians manipulate electoral lines; as
Justice Kagan underscores in her dissent, everyone agrees that
they do. The question is whether they ought to. And as Justice
Kagan clearly and forcefully shows, the doctrine, particularly
as applied by the lower courts below, can easily be read and
applied to prohibit the practice, at the very least to prohibit
the worst form of it. The conclusion is thus inescapable: Rucho
must be understood as a normative defense of the practice of
partisanship.
I d. at 2497 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)).
Id. at 2499.
77
Id. at 2500
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Rucho reflects a traditional portrayal of American
representative democracy as—rightly or inevitably—partisan,
unfair, and dirty. And given these unavoidable features, it
is futile and unbecoming for federal courts to try to remove
the lifeblood of the process, which is its partisanship, its
sordidness, and its own conception of what is fair or unfair. If
the polity is unsatisfied with the sordid nature of its politics,
the Constitution has provided a structural political process
solution. This defense of traditional politics is the best way to
understand Rucho.
* * *
If we are right that Rucho represents a normative defense
of dirty politics, of the legitimacy of employing partisanship
to acquire political power so that politicians may advance
their particular views of the common good, what does Rucho
mean for the future of political-gerrymandering claims?
American representative democracy has been on a slow march
toward greater fairness, equality, and openness. Progress in
this domain has not always been inevitable and, to be sure,
we have sometimes taken some significant steps backwards.
Notwithstanding these backward steps, American democracy
is more representative today than it has been in any time
in our history. To the extent that Rucho reflects a clash of
normative visions about fairness, and to the extent that a
traditional Darwinian view of politics prevailed in Rucho, the
traditionalists are increasingly in the minority. Recent polls
have shown that the American public is supportive of judicial
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limits on political gerrymandering.78 Moreover, we are seeing
a growing receptiveness in the United States to alternative
voting systems, to semi-proportional systems, and to more
electoral innovation.79 Thus, while proportional representation
is currently a dirty word in the Court’s jurisprudence, it
might come to be viewed in the United States as the de facto
standard of fairness for judging electoral systems. And while
partisanship is now viewed as inevitable, it might come to be
viewed as constitutionally unacceptable. Change will come, if
it comes, as a consequence of a change in our normative vision.
If this is right, it is not inconceivable that we will come to see
Rucho as we now look at Colegrove v. Green. And thus, it won’t
be long before this generation gets its very own Baker v. Carr.
If this is right, it also raises a note of caution for scholars of
election law. Election law scholars and election law scholarship
was once significantly oriented around doctrinal, theoretical,
and normative arguments about how to think about various
law and democracy questions. This doctrinal, normative,
and theoretical orientation allowed legal academics to make
use of their comparative advantage. In the last few years,
the scholarship in the field has taken a significant empirical
turn, which in many respects is a useful development. But
that empirical turn seems to have come at the expense of
the focus on understanding the doctrine, theory, and the
normative trade-offs that are inevitable in this domain. For
example, in the domain of political gerrymandering, scholars
have misunderstood the term of art, judicially manageable
standards, to mean an empirical or mathematical standard.
This misunderstanding is particularly encapsulated by the
Americans Are United Against Partisan Gerrymandering, Brennan Ctr. For Justice (Mar. 15,
2019).
79
Ranked Choice Voting/Instant Runoff, Fair Vote (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
78
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excessive focus on the ill-fated efficiency gap. If our account
of Rucho is correct, that it was decided on normative and
theoretical grounds, the field of election law might need to
figure out how to privilege once more the doctrinal, theoretical,
and normative approaches that are the staple of legal scholars
in the face of legal problems.
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